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ARTICLE 5 - RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
James J. White 
I. Mitigation in Letter of Credit Transactions 
Assume a Buyer has procured a letter of credit to pay for 
contracted goods but no longer wants the goods. The Buyer and the 
Issuer would like to force the Beneficiary to mitigate. Assume 
that both the Issuer and Applicant repudiate their obligation or 
that the Applicant has failed and the Issuer repudiates its 
obligation to pay under the letter of credit . At the moment of 
repudiation the price for a gallon of the underlying oil that is 
the subject of the letter of credit is $.75 and that the letter 
of credit provides for payment at $l.OO.per gallon. Seller off 
loads the oil, presents the proper documents and the documents 
are dishonored when the oil is worth $.75. The oil continues to 
decline in value to $.40 and the Beneficiary sues the Issuer and 
asks for the full amount of its draw. (Assume that to be $1 per 
gallon times 1 million gallons or a $1 million claim.) Can the 
Issuer reduce the Beneficiary's claim by the amount that could 
have been saved by the Beneficiary's mitigation--namely the 
difference between $.75 per gallon (the value of the oil at the 
time of repudiation) and $.40 per gallon (the value of the oil at 
the time of buyer's later disposition)? 
The answer is no. One sentence in Section 5-11l(a) reads as 
follows: "The claimant is not obligated to take action to avoid 
damages that might be due from the issuer under this section." 
That sentence is further elaborated by the following language 
from Comment 1 to 5-111. 
"The right to specific performance is new. The express 
limitation on the duty of the beneficiary to mitigate 
damages adopts the position of certain courts and 
commentators. Becau~e the letter of credit depends upon 
speed and certainty of payment, it is important that the 
issuer not be given an incentive to dishonor. The issuer 
might have an incentive to dishonor if it could rely on the 
burden of mitigation falling on the beneficiary (to sell 
goods and sue only for the difference between the price of 
the goods sold and the amount due under the letter of 
credit). Under the scheme contemplated ~y Section 5-111(a), 
the beneficiary would present the documents to the issuer. 
If the issuer wrongfully dishonored, the beneficiary would 
have no further duty to the issuer with respect to the goods 
covered by documents that the issuer dishonored and 
returned. The issuer thus takes the risk that the 
beneficiary will let the goods rot or be destroyed. Of 
course the beneficiary may have a duty of mitigation to the 
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applicant ar~s~ng from the underlying agreement, but the 
issuer would not have the right to assert that duty by way 
of defense or setoff. See Section 5-117(d). If the 
beneficiary sells the goods covered by dishonored documents 
or if the beneficiary sells a draft after acceptance but 
before dishonor by the issuer, the net amount so gained 
should be subtracted from the amount of the beneficiary's 
damages--at least where the damage claim against the issuer 
equals or exceeds the damage suffered by the beneficiary. 
If, on the other hand, the beneficiary suffers damages in an 
underlying transactiop in an amount that exceeds the amount 
of the wrongfully dishonored demand (e.g., where the ~etter 
of credit does not cover 100 percent of the underlying 
obligation), the damages avoided should not necessarily be 
deducted from the beneficiary's claim against the issuer. 
In such a case, the damages would be the lesser of (i) the 
amount recoverable in the absence of mitigation (that is, 
the amount that is subject to the dishonor or repudiation 
plus any incidental damages) and (ii) the damages remaining 
after deduction for the amount of damages actually avoided." 
The burden of mitigation is on the Applicant or if the 
Applicant has failed , on the Issuer. By procuring a letter of 
credit the Seller has purchased the right not to mitigate, at 
least vis a vis the Issuer. 
For a different, but similar case, consider Clark Oil 
Trading Co. v. J. Aron & Co., 32 UCC2d 699 (N.Y.Cty. 1997). There 
was a letter of credit for slightly more than $8 million. The 
contract price was .9770 per gallon of heating oil that Aron was 
obliged to deliver to Clark . As oft en happens, there were some 
difficulties with delivery which were seized upon by Clark to 
avoid a bad bargain. Shortly before the time of delivery Clark 
repudiated the contract. It justified its repudiation on the 
ground that the Seller-Beneficiary had itself broken the 
contract. The Seller proceeded with performance, delivering the 
oil to an oil storage facility in Bayonne, N.J . , presented 
documents and collected more than $8 million from Bank Paribas, 
the Issuer. Clark then sued Aron and claimed that Aron had had a 
duty to mitigate on Clark ' s repudiation. The court agrees with 
that proposition, but concludes that Aron's failure to mitigate 
was an insubstantial breach following the substantial breach of 
Clark and leaves Clark with essentially the entire loss. In the 
interim, Clark had resold the oil for a little under $5 million. 
Because Bank Paribas honored the letter of credit, this case 
does not deal with 5-111. However, it presents an interesting 
question whether the policy of 5-111 (against requiring the 
beneficiary to mitigate) should be extended to the beneficiary's 
underlying obligation under Article 2 of the UCC. Put another 
way, by bargaining for a letter of credit had the parties 
implicitly agreed that the seller was free to continue 
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performance even after repudiation by the buyer at least if that 
performance was necessary to procure payment? That is not a 
crazy conclusion, but it is not required by 5-111. Although that 
is the practical outcome of the Clark case, it is in conflict 
with the language and legal analysis of that case. What do you 
think? 
II. Fraud and Injunction Under Revised 5-109 
Assume that a letter of credit requires a certification by 
an official of the government of Bangladesh that the goods 
originated in Bangladesh. Assume further that the beneficiary's 
advising bank presents documents, one of which is later conceded 
to be a counterfeit certification for goods that were made in 
Pakistan. 
Under old Article 5 and under Revised 5-109, the 
beneficiary's act would constitute material fraud and render the 
documents either "forged" or "materially fraudulent". If the 
other conditions under 5-109 are met, honor should be enjoined 
and, if the issuer chose to do so, it would have a right to 
decline to honor. 
What if the advising bank claims to be a holder in due 
course? The persons entitled to demand payment under 5-109 are 
quite narrowly specified in 5-109(a) (1) as follows: 
(a) If a presentation is made that appears on its face 
strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the 
letter of credit, but a required document is forged or 
materially fraudulent, or honor of the presentation would 
facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer 
or applicant: 
(1) the issuer shall honor the presentation, if 
honor is demanded by (i) a nominated person who has 
given value in good faith and without notice of forgery 
or material fraud, (ii) a confirmer who has honored its 
confirmation in good faith, (iii) a holder in due 
course of a draft drawn under the letter of credit 
which was taken after acceptance by the issuer or 
nominated person, or (iv) an assignee of the issuer's 
or nominated person's deferred obligation that was 
taken for value and without notice of forgery or 
material fraud after the obligation was incurred by the 
issuer or nominated person[.] 
In this case the person demanding payment may have been a 
"nominated person," but if it was merely a holder in due course 
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of the drafts and not a nominated person, that would be 
insufficient to entitle it to payment. Under Revised 5-102, a 
nominated person is "a person whom the issuer (i) designates or 
authorizes to pay, accept, negotiate, or otherwise give value 
under a letter of credit and (ii) undertakes by agreement or 
custom and practice to reimburse." Thus, if this were a "freely 
negotiable" letter, so that every bank in the world was a 
potential "nominated person", the bank would qualify as a 
nominated person who had given value in good faith. Being merely 
a holder in due course would not be enough. 
Apply these rules to a recent New York case, Regent Corp. 
U.S.A. v. Azmat Bangladesh Ltd., 32 UCC2d 900 (N.Y. Cty. 1997). 
Azmat presented a fraudulent document that purported to be the 
certification of an official government representative of 
Bangladesh, but was a forgery. Apparen~ly the goods had come 
from Pakistan, not from Bangladesh. The fraud was discovered in 
the middle of a series of transactions where some letters had 
been honored by citibank's and Bank of New York's acceptance and 
others had not been honored. Honor was enjoined. The court found 
that the advising bank, IFIC, was not a holder in due course 
because the documents were not payable at a time certain. The 
time payable was tied to the date on the bill of lading. The 
court did allow IFIC to state a separate cause of action against 
the banks for a claim on the drafts that had been accepted. 
Note how the new Code would deal with this case. First IFIC 
would have to qualify as a nominated person who has given value 
in good faith and without notice of forgery or material fraud. 
If it was not a nominated person, or if it knew of the forged 
document, it could not qualify. The new Code does not recognize 
holders in due course as special persons unless they have taken 
drafts "after acceptance by the issuer or nominated person." 
IFIC might be able to recover on the accepted drafts. Of course, 
on those too, there would be a question of its knowledge of and 
conn1vance with the beneficiary. (The claim was made that the 
fraud was done at the insistence or at least with the cooperation 
of IFIC to the end that tne beneficiary's indebtedness to IFIC 
could be paid off.) 
III. Bank's Duty to Give Notice Upon Dishonor 
Assume that beneficiary presents documents that have two 
minor defects. The defects are that the bill of lading 
identifies New York instead of New Jersey as the shipment's 
origination, and omits the contact person's FAX number. The 
bank, regarding these as "minor" errors, asked for and got a 
waiver from its applicant. Notwithstanding the waiver, the bank 
refused to pay. However, the bank failed to notify the 
beneficiary within seven days of presentment that it was 
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dishonoring. The issuer had been discussing the deviations with 
the applicant, and in the communications with the beneficiary 
during the seven-day period, the issuer gave indications that it 
would ultimately pay. 
Upon issuer's dishonor, what liability under Revised 5-108? 
The bank argued that there was no proximate cause between its 
refusal to pay or to give notice and the loss because the 
discrepancies could not have been cured by the beneficiary. 
Furthermore, it argued that the beneficiary knew of the 
discrepancies and that that knowledge barred its recovery. 
Under the terms of Revised 5-108 and of UCP 500, the issuer 
has a reasonable time, but not beyond seven days (seven business 
days under the UCC and seven banking days under the UCP) to give 
notice of discrepancy. Under Revised 5-108(c) the bank is 
foreclosed from defending its dishonor by showing discrepancies 
if it fails to give that notice: 
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), an 
issuer is precluded from asserting as a basis for dishonor 
any discrepancy if timely notice is not given, or any 
discrepancy not stated in the notice if timely notice is 
given. 
In the case posed, Revised 5-108 would foreclose the bank 
from proving discrepancies upon its failure to honor. It would 
lose a suit for wrongful dishonor; it would be no defense that 
the beneficiary knew or suspected there were discrepancies. Nor 
would it be any defense that any discrepancies could not be 
cured. 
This outcome under 5-108 is consistent with the most recent 
conclusion in a long-running case entitled: Bombay Indus. Inc. v. 
Bank of New York, 32 UCC2d 1155 (N.Y. Cty. 1997). In the earlier 
version of that case the lower court held that once the issuer 
had sought and received a waiver, it would have to follow that 
waiver. That decision wa~ reversed on appeal, but the bank still 
loses because the court now finds that the bank did not give 
notice within the seven-day period under the UCP. It further 
finds that knowledge on the part of the beneficiary of the 
discrepancies or the inability of the beneficiary to cure is not 
relevant. 
Where a letter of credit requires presentation "no later 
than 15 days after shipment, but within validity of the credit" 
and where a presentation is made on the 14th day, at least one 
court holds that the rules in the UCP do not enlarge the time 
(beyond the 15 days) for a cure. See Banco General Ruinahui, 
S.A. v. Citibank International, 30 UCC2d 1163 (1996). (I would 
not be embarrassed to argue for a contrary interpretation of the 
UCP and section 5-108 of the UCC.) 
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IV. Fraud and the Bank's Duty to Its customer on Clean Letters 
of credit. 
Bank issues a "clean" letter of credit at the request of its 
Applicant. (A clean letter of credit requires the presentation 
of only a draft and no other document; for obvious reasons, it is 
sometimes called a "suicide" letter of credit.) The beneficiary 
presents a draft and the applicant seeks an injunction because he 
claims that there is fraud and that the presentation under 5-109 
"would facilitate a materi,al fraud by the beneficiary on the 
issuer" (i.e., that the beneficiary knows that he has not e~rned 
the right under the underlying contract and is intentionally 
presenting the draft as an attempt to defraud the applicant) . 
One response to the argument is that no draft could ever be 
materially fraudulent or facilitate a material fraud because, by 
hypothesis, the applicant has agreed to commit suicide, i.e., he 
has by his very act given authority to someone to draw on his 
bank account without any representation at all. The Comments to 
Revised 5-109 take the position that the beneficiary can commit 
fraud in presenting a draft under a clean letter, but that the 
court should be "skeptical" of such claims: 
Whether a beneficiary can commit fraud by presenting a 
draft under a clean letter of credit (one calling only for a 
draft and no other documents) has been much debated. Under 
the current formulation it would be possible but difficult 
for there to be fraud in such a presentation. If the 
applicant were able to show that the beneficiary were 
committing material fraud on the applicant in the underlying 
transaction, then payment would facilitate a material fraud 
by the beneficiary on the applicant and honor could be 
enjoined. The courts should be skeptical of claims of fraud 
by one who has signed a "suicide" or clean credit and thus 
granted a beneficiary the right to draw by mere presentation 
of a draft. 
For a case in which the bank paid on a clean letter of credit and 
was then sued by its applicant for its failure to educate its 
applicant about the risks of clean letters, see McCormack v. 
Citibank, 30 UCC2d 1175 {8th Cir. 1996). The court rules as a 
matter of law that the issuer did not owe a fiduciary duty to its 
customer to spell out the ramifications of a clean letter. The 
customer needs to keep its own eyes open. 
v. Multiple Transactions and Waivers. 
Assume that beneficiary and account party have multiple 
transactions and on a number of occasions beneficiary presents 
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similar documents and the bank always honors. Unbeknownst to the 
beneficiary, honor occurs not because its presentation strictly 
complies, but because the applicant waives. On the final 
transaction, the applicant refuses to waive, or the issuer fails 
to ask for a waiver. Is there a duty to pay? The answer is no. 
The comments to Revised 5-108 indorse the position in the leading 
case from the Fourth Circuit, Courtaulds: 
The issuer's obligation to dishonor when there is no 
apparent compliance with the letter of credit runs only to 
the applicant. No other party to the transaction can 
complain if the appl~cant waives compliance with term~ or 
conditions of the letter of credit or agrees to a less 
stringent standard for compliance than that supplied by this 
article. Except as otherwise agreed with the applicant, an 
issuer may dishonor a noncomplying presentation despite an 
applicant's waiver. 
Waiver of discrepancies by an issuer or an applicant in 
one or more presentations does not waive similar 
discrepancies in a future presentation. Neither the issuer 
nor the beneficiary can reasonably rely upon honor over past 
waivers as a basis for concluding that a future defective 
presentation will justify honor. The reasoning of 
courtaulds of North America Inc. v. North Carolina National 
Bank, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975) is accepted and that 
expressed in Schweibish v. Pontchartrain State Bank, 389 
So.2d 731 (La.App. 1980) and Titanium Metals Corp. v. Space 
Metals, Inc., 529 P.2d 431 (Utah 1974) is rejected. 
Accord, Bangkok Vest Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v . Park Avenue Bank, 
N.A. Inc., 31 UCC2d 1098 (N.Y. Cty. 1997). 
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